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Abstract	  
This	  review	  asks	  whether	  observers	  can	  obtain	  information	  about	  others’	  intentions	  from	  
observation	  of	  their	  actions;	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  this	  process	  is	  performed	  using	  direct	  perceptual	  or	  
inferential	  processes	  (prominent	  examples	  of	  each	  being	  the	  intention	  understanding	  theory	  of	  
mirror	  neuron	  function,	  and	  mentalizing	  accounts	  of	  intention	  understanding,	  respectively).	  I	  
propose	  four	  conditions	  that	  should	  be	  fulfilled	  in	  order	  to	  support	  a	  direct	  perception	  account,	  and	  
suggest	  that	  only	  two	  of	  these	  conditions	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  existing	  data.	  I	  then	  propose	  and	  
review	  three	  further	  sources	  of	  evidence	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  inform	  this	  debate,	  concluding	  
that	  the	  data	  do	  not	  support	  the	  direct	  perception	  account.	  In	  particular,	  mirror	  neurons	  may	  be	  
involved	  in	  lower-­‐level	  processes	  of	  action	  perception,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  their	  
involvement	  in	  the	  type	  of	  higher-­‐level	  intention	  understanding	  that	  is	  proposed	  by	  the	  direct	  
perception	  account.	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1.	  Introduction	  
The	  overarching	  question	  of	  this	  special	  issue	  is	  how	  humans	  acquire	  information	  about	  other	  
people’s	  mental	  states.	  In	  this	  review	  I	  focus	  on	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  mental	  state:	  that	  of	  having	  an	  
intention,	  i.e.	  a	  motive	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  an	  effect;	  and	  I	  discuss	  the	  
processes	  by	  which	  humans	  can	  acquire	  information	  about	  others’	  intentions,	  i.e.	  identify	  why	  an	  
action	  was	  performed,	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  
The	  link	  between	  action	  observation	  and	  intention	  understanding	  has	  garnered	  particular	  interest	  
over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  due	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  ‘mirror’	  neurons	  in	  the	  macaque	  (di	  Pellegrino,	  
Fadiga,	  Fogassi,	  Gallese,	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  1992)	  and	  subsequently	  the	  human	  (Mukamel,	  Ekstrom,	  
Kaplan,	  Iacoboni,	  &	  Fried,	  2010)	  brain.	  These	  neurons	  have	  been	  found	  primarily	  in	  motor	  areas	  of	  
the	  macaque	  brain	  (although	  the	  human	  data	  suggest	  that	  they	  may	  be	  considerably	  more	  
widespread)	  including	  premotor,	  primary	  motor,	  and	  parietal	  cortex	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  
Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Kraskov,	  Dancause,	  Quallo,	  Shepherd,	  &	  Lemon,	  2009).	  The	  defining	  
characteristic	  of	  a	  mirror	  neuron	  is	  that	  it	  fires	  both	  when	  performing	  an	  action,	  and	  when	  passively	  
perceiving	  the	  same,	  or	  a	  related,	  action	  performed	  either	  by	  a	  conspecific	  or	  an	  experimenter	  (the	  
perceived	  action	  can	  be	  presented	  in	  either	  the	  auditory	  or	  visual	  modality:	  Cook,	  2012;	  Kohler	  et	  al.,	  
2002;	  but	  for	  conciseness,	  this	  review	  will	  focus	  on	  vision	  as	  the	  modality	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  
research	  has	  been	  performed).	  Thus,	  mirror	  neurons	  appear	  to	  match	  the	  observation	  of	  another’s	  
action	  with	  the	  motor	  program	  that	  would	  be	  required	  for	  the	  observer	  to	  produce	  that	  action	  
themselves.	  This	  characteristic	  has	  led	  to	  speculation	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  underlie	  the	  ability	  to	  
understand	  others’	  intentions	  by	  observing	  their	  actions.	  For	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  
mirror	  neurons	  allow	  us	  to	  “…	  understand	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  by	  means	  of	  our	  own	  ‘motor	  
knowledge’:	  this	  knowledge	  enables	  us	  immediately	  to	  attribute	  an	  intentional	  meaning	  to	  the	  
movements	  of	  others”	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2007,	  p.	  205).	  The	  term	  ‘intention’	  has	  been	  used	  in	  
the	  mirror	  neuron	  literature	  to	  refer	  both	  to	  the	  immediate	  outcome	  of	  an	  action,	  and	  to	  the	  higher-­‐
level	  motivation	  that	  produced	  the	  action.	  This	  review	  focuses	  on	  the	  latter	  definition	  because	  it	  is	  
more	  clearly	  related	  to	  the	  mental	  state	  of	  having	  an	  intention.	  In	  addition,	  this	  definition	  has	  
excited	  the	  most	  interest	  precisely	  because	  it	  suggests	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  
identifying	  an	  actor’s	  underlying	  intention.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  either	  for	  or	  against	  this	  claim	  is	  
relatively	  sparse	  (Cook,	  Bird,	  Catmur,	  Press,	  &	  Heyes,	  2014).	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  establish:	  
whether	  we	  can	  indeed	  acquire	  information	  about	  others’	  intentions	  from	  observation	  of	  their	  
actions;	  whether	  this	  process	  is	  performed	  by	  mirror	  neurons,	  and	  if	  not,	  what	  are	  the	  alternative	  
candidate	  processes	  for	  acquiring	  information	  about	  intentions;	  and	  which	  of	  these	  processes	  is	  best	  
supported	  by	  the	  existing	  data.	  
In	  section	  2	  I	  review	  evidence	  for	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  acquire	  information	  about	  intentions	  from	  
the	  observation	  of	  others’	  actions:	  is	  information	  about	  intentions	  indeed	  present	  in	  performed	  
actions,	  and	  if	  so,	  do	  observers	  make	  use	  of	  this	  information?	  The	  third	  section	  asks	  how	  observers	  
can	  acquire	  this	  information,	  and	  sets	  out	  the	  competing	  possibilities,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  
distinction	  between	  direct	  perception	  and	  inferential	  processes	  described	  by	  Michael	  and	  de	  Bruin	  
(this	  issue).	  I	  discuss	  what	  would	  constitute	  evidence	  for	  one	  of	  these	  processes	  over	  another,	  and	  
review	  the	  current	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  I	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  insufficient	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  
involvement	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  understanding	  others’	  intentions,	  and	  that	  the	  existing	  data	  are	  
better	  explained	  by	  the	  involvement	  of	  inferential	  processes.	  	  
2.	  Can	  we	  acquire	  intentions	  from	  actions?	  
In	  order	  to	  acquire	  information	  about	  an	  actor’s	  intentions	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  their	  actions,	  
two	  conditions	  need	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  (see	  Ansuini,	  Cavallo,	  Bertone,	  &	  Becchio,	  2014,	  for	  a	  more	  
detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  literature).	  First,	  there	  need	  to	  exist	  reliable	  perceptual	  differences	  
between	  actions	  performed	  with	  different	  intentions;	  and	  second,	  observers	  must	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  
and	  utilise	  these	  differences	  to	  make	  judgements	  about	  the	  actor’s	  intentions.	  
2.1.	  Intentions	  modulate	  action	  kinematics	  
A	  substantial	  body	  of	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  an	  actor’s	  intentions	  can	  indeed	  modulate	  the	  
kinematics	  of	  their	  subsequent	  action.	  Importantly,	  the	  kinematics	  of	  reach-­‐to-­‐grasp	  actions	  are	  
modulated	  even	  when	  actions	  are	  performed	  on	  the	  same	  object,	  but	  with	  different	  intentions.	  Thus	  
Marteniuk	  and	  colleagues	  (1987)	  demonstrated	  differences	  in	  the	  kinematic	  profiles	  of	  actions	  when	  
the	  actor’s	  intention	  was	  to	  place	  an	  object	  carefully	  into	  a	  small	  container,	  versus	  into	  a	  large	  box	  
(see	  Ansuini,	  Giosa,	  Turella,	  Altoè,	  &	  Castiello,	  2008;	  Ansuini,	  Santello,	  Massaccesi,	  &	  Castiello,	  2006,	  
for	  a	  similar	  result).	  Consistent	  with	  these	  results,	  Schuboe	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  showed	  kinematic	  
differences	  between	  actions	  towards	  a	  bottle	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  pour	  or	  to	  
place	  the	  bottle;	  and	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  studies	  from	  Becchio	  and	  colleagues	  demonstrated	  
differences	  in	  kinematics	  between	  cooperative	  and	  competitive	  actions,	  between	  social	  and	  non-­‐
social	  actions,	  and	  between	  individual	  and	  communicative	  actions	  (Becchio,	  Sartori,	  Bulgheroni,	  &	  
Castiello,	  2008;	  Georgiou,	  Becchio,	  Glover,	  &	  Castiello,	  2007;	  Sartori,	  Becchio,	  Bara,	  &	  Castiello,	  
2009).	  Most	  recently,	  Naish	  and	  colleagues	  (2013)	  demonstrated	  systematic	  differences	  between	  
the	  kinematic	  profile	  of	  reach-­‐to-­‐grasp	  movements	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  
movement	  was	  to	  place	  an	  object	  or	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  the	  mouth.	  Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  actions	  performed	  
with	  different	  intentions	  do	  result	  in	  reliable	  kinematic,	  and	  thus	  presumably	  perceptual,	  
differences.	  
2.2.	  Do	  observers	  use	  action	  kinematics	  to	  acquire	  intention	  information?	  
Whether	  observers	  are	  able	  to	  use	  these	  kinematic	  differences	  to	  make	  judgements	  about	  an	  actor’s	  
intentions	  is	  less	  clear-­‐cut.	  Work	  from	  Becchio	  and	  colleagues	  indicated	  that	  observers	  can	  use	  
kinematic	  information	  to	  judge	  whether	  actions	  are	  performed	  in	  a	  competitive	  or	  cooperative	  
context	  (Sartori,	  Becchio,	  &	  Castiello,	  2011);	  and	  that	  observers	  can	  extract	  and	  use	  this	  kinematic	  
information	  to	  make	  such	  judgements	  even	  from	  relatively	  degraded	  point-­‐light	  displays	  (Manera,	  
Becchio,	  Cavallo,	  Sartori,	  &	  Castiello,	  2011).	  Similar	  results	  from	  Stapel	  and	  colleagues	  (2012)	  
indicated	  that	  observers	  use	  kinematic	  information	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  actor	  intends	  to	  
continue	  walking	  or	  to	  crawl	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  target	  object.	  In	  contrast,	  Naish	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  
demonstrated	  that	  observers	  were	  not	  able	  to	  use	  kinematic	  information	  to	  decide	  whether	  an	  actor	  
was	  performing	  a	  reaching	  movement	  in	  order	  to	  place	  an	  object,	  or	  in	  order	  to	  eat	  it.	  This	  inability	  
to	  acquire	  intention	  information	  from	  kinematics	  is	  perhaps	  surprising	  since	  there	  were	  reliable	  
differences	  between	  the	  kinematic	  profiles	  of	  these	  two	  types	  of	  action	  (see	  section	  2.1).	  However,	  
Naish	  et	  al.	  did	  not	  test	  whether	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  detect	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  
profiles	  (for	  example,	  by	  using	  a	  delayed	  match	  to	  sample	  task).	  Such	  a	  task	  would	  establish	  whether	  
the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  kinematic	  profiles	  were	  not	  perceived	  by	  the	  observers,	  or	  whether	  
these	  differences	  were	  perceived	  but	  instead	  observers	  were	  unable	  to	  label	  or	  identify	  the	  profiles	  
as	  ‘reach-­‐to-­‐place’	  versus	  ‘reach-­‐to-­‐eat’.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  it	  appears	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  observers	  are	  able	  to	  use	  kinematic	  information	  to	  
acquire	  information	  about	  actors’	  intentions;	  but	  it	  will	  be	  important	  for	  future	  work	  to	  establish	  
whether	  failures	  to	  use	  such	  information	  are	  due	  to	  an	  inability	  to	  detect	  kinematic	  differences,	  or	  to	  
identify	  the	  intention	  associated	  with	  the	  kinematic	  profile.	  Another	  important	  question	  for	  future	  
research	  is	  whether	  kinematic	  information	  is	  useful	  when	  judging	  intentions	  from	  richer	  stimuli	  in	  
more	  ecologically	  valid	  settings.	  
3.	  How	  do	  we	  acquire	  intentions	  from	  actions?	  
In	  cases	  where	  observers	  are	  able	  to	  acquire	  intention	  information	  from	  action	  kinematics,	  how	  does	  
this	  process	  occur?	  Michael	  and	  de	  Bruin	  (this	  issue)	  set	  out	  two	  competing	  possibilities:	  intention	  
information	  may	  be	  acquired	  from	  action	  kinematics	  via	  ‘direct’	  perception,	  or	  via	  inferential	  
processes.	  Direct	  perception	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  perception	  of	  others	  (in	  this	  case	  of	  their	  action	  
kinematics)	  results	  in	  ‘direct’	  awareness	  of	  their	  mental	  states	  (in	  this	  case	  of	  their	  intentions).	  The	  
suggestion	  by	  Rizzolatti	  and	  Sinigaglia	  (2007;	  see	  also	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Fogassi,	  2014)	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  
responses	  allow	  us	  “immediately	  to	  attribute	  an	  intentional	  meaning	  to	  the	  movements	  of	  others”	  
fits	  within	  a	  direct	  perception	  framework	  if	  ‘intentional’	  refers	  to	  the	  actor’s	  underlying	  motivation	  
for	  performing	  the	  observed	  movement.	  (If,	  instead,	  ‘intentional’	  refers	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
actor’s	  movement,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  responses	  are	  not	  an	  example	  of	  direct	  
perception	  because	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  information	  about	  the	  underlying	  mental	  state	  of	  the	  
actor.	  This	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case,	  but	  as	  stated	  above,	  the	  word	  ‘intention’	  is	  used	  in	  the	  mirror	  
neuron	  literature	  to	  refer	  to	  something	  more	  akin	  to	  mental	  states	  than	  to	  identification	  of	  an	  action	  
outcome,	  and	  my	  interpretation	  follows	  this	  more	  common	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  ‘intention’.)	  In	  
contrast,	  inferential	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  perception	  of	  action	  kinematics	  is	  followed	  by	  the	  
recruitment	  of	  other	  cognitive	  or	  inferential	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  awareness	  of	  the	  other’s	  
intentions.	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  description	  that	  definitions	  of	  perception	  and	  of	  inference	  are	  crucial	  to	  this	  
debate;	  however,	  as	  Michael	  and	  de	  Bruin	  note,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  reducing	  this	  discussion	  to	  a	  mere	  
terminological	  argument.	  In	  addition,	  these	  definitions	  are	  addressed	  in	  greater	  detail	  elsewhere	  in	  
this	  special	  issue.	  Therefore,	  rather	  than	  focus	  on	  definitions,	  I	  address	  this	  question	  from	  two	  
alternative	  angles,	  asking	  first,	  whether	  a	  mirror	  response	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  constitute	  intention	  
understanding;	  and	  second,	  what	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  would	  support	  a	  direct	  perception	  over	  an	  
inferential	  account	  of	  intention	  understanding,	  where	  ‘direct	  perception’	  encompasses,	  but	  is	  not	  
limited	  to,	  the	  ‘immediate’	  attribution	  of	  intention	  described	  in	  the	  quote	  above.	  I	  then	  review	  the	  
evidence	  for	  these	  two	  accounts.	  
3.1.	  Do	  mirror	  neuron	  responses	  constitute	  intention	  understanding?	  
Proponents	  of	  the	  intention	  understanding	  theory	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  function	  have	  suggested	  that	  
the	  presence	  of	  mirror	  responses	  (activation	  of	  same	  motor	  program	  as	  that	  used	  by	  the	  actor)	  is,	  
itself,	  a	  kind	  of	  intention	  understanding:	  that	  activation	  of	  a	  motor	  program	  by	  the	  sight	  of	  another’s	  
action	  corresponds	  to	  understanding	  of	  their	  intentions.	  As	  we	  have	  discussed	  elsewhere	  (Cook	  et	  
al.,	  2014)	  this	  claim	  is	  potentially	  circular:	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  ask	  whether	  mirror	  neuron	  responses	  
are	  the	  basis	  of	  intention	  understanding	  if	  such	  responses	  are	  defined	  as	  constituting	  intention	  
understanding.	  	  
However,	  if	  mirror	  responses	  do	  not	  per	  se	  constitute	  intention	  understanding,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  useful	  
to	  ask	  under	  what	  conditions	  such	  responses	  could	  correspond	  to	  understanding	  of	  the	  other’s	  
intentions.	  To	  recap:	  a	  mirror	  response	  indicates	  that	  the	  same	  motor	  program	  is	  active	  in	  the	  
observer	  as	  in	  the	  actor.	  In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  direct	  understanding	  of	  the	  other’s	  
intentions,	  I	  suggest	  that	  at	  least	  four	  conditions	  need	  to	  be	  fulfilled:	  1)	  the	  sight	  of	  an	  action	  must	  
activate	  only	  one,	  matching,	  motor	  program	  in	  the	  observer;	  2)	  this	  motor	  program	  must	  have	  a	  
one-­‐to-­‐one	  mapping	  with	  the	  observer’s	  own	  intention;	  3)	  this	  mapping	  from	  motor	  program	  to	  
intention	  must	  be	  the	  same	  in	  the	  observer	  as	  in	  the	  actor;	  and	  4)	  upon	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  
program,	  the	  associated	  intention	  must	  be	  automatically	  activated,	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  any	  
higher-­‐level	  inferential	  processes.	  	  
The	  reasoning	  behind	  these	  conditions	  is	  as	  follows:	  1)	  if	  more	  than	  one	  motor	  program	  (or	  a	  non-­‐
matching	  motor	  program)	  is	  activated	  in	  the	  observer,	  then	  multiple	  intentions	  (or	  the	  ‘wrong’	  
intention)	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  actor;	  2)	  and	  3)	  if	  the	  observer’s	  motor	  program	  does	  not	  
correspond	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  intention	  as	  that	  of	  the	  actor’s	  motor	  program,	  again	  the	  ‘wrong’	  
intention	  could	  be	  attributed;	  and	  finally,	  without	  condition	  4),	  mirror	  responses	  may	  contribute	  to	  
intention	  understanding	  but	  cannot	  correspond	  to	  intention	  understanding	  (unless	  activation	  of	  a	  
motor	  program	  constitutes	  intention	  understanding,	  with	  the	  associated	  circularity	  this	  claim	  
implies).	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  full	  account	  of	  how	  mirror	  responses	  contribute	  to	  intention	  
understanding	  must	  show	  how	  they	  contribute	  over	  and	  above	  purely	  perceptual	  processes	  (e.g.	  
vision).	  	  
Section	  2.1	  suggests	  that	  conditions	  2	  and	  3	  may	  be	  fulfilled,	  because	  –	  at	  least	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  
the	  types	  of	  action	  used	  in	  these	  studies	  –	  actions	  performed	  with	  different	  intentions	  produce	  
patterns	  of	  kinematics	  which	  are	  distinct	  for	  different	  actions	  and	  consistent	  across	  actors.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  the	  evidence	  for	  condition	  1	  has	  been	  scrutinised	  recently	  (Cook	  &	  Bird,	  2013):	  macaque	  
‘mirror’	  neuron	  responses	  indicate	  that	  the	  observation	  of	  an	  action	  does	  not	  always	  activate	  a	  
matching	  motor	  program	  in	  the	  observer.	  In	  fact,	  the	  majority	  of	  ‘mirror’	  neurons	  respond	  to	  the	  
observation	  and	  performance	  of	  similar,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  exactly	  the	  same,	  actions.	  Without	  strict	  
congruency	  between	  the	  motor	  programs	  of	  actor	  and	  observer,	  the	  claim	  that	  mirror	  responses	  are	  
sufficient	  for	  intention	  understanding	  becomes	  precarious.	  Finally,	  condition	  4	  has	  not,	  to	  my	  
knowledge,	  been	  investigated	  directly,	  although	  related	  questions	  are	  addressed	  in	  sections	  3.3-­‐3.5.	  
In	  conclusion:	  to	  establish	  whether	  mirror	  responses	  are	  involved	  in	  intention	  understanding,	  future	  
research	  needs	  to	  establish	  whether	  action	  observation	  consistently	  leads	  to	  activation	  of	  a	  
matching	  motor	  program	  in	  the	  observer;	  whether	  activation	  of	  a	  motor	  program	  consistently	  and	  
inevitably	  leads	  to	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  associated	  intention;	  and	  whether	  this	  results	  in	  a	  greater	  
ability	  to	  understand	  an	  actor’s	  intentions	  than	  would	  be	  possible	  with	  vision	  alone.	  Without	  such	  
evidence,	  it	  would	  be	  premature	  to	  conclude	  that	  mirror	  responses	  constitute	  direct	  attribution	  of	  
others’	  intentions.	  Therefore	  section	  3.2	  asks	  what	  other	  types	  of	  evidence	  could	  support	  a	  direct	  
perception	  over	  an	  inferential	  account	  of	  intention	  understanding.	  
3.2.	  Types	  of	  evidence	  
One	  source	  of	  evidence	  relates	  to	  the	  timecourse	  of	  intention	  understanding.	  Compared	  to	  direct	  
perception	  accounts,	  inferential	  accounts	  posit	  an	  additional	  processing	  stage	  between	  perception	  
and	  awareness	  of	  intentions;	  thus	  it	  might	  be	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  direct	  perception	  accounts	  
predict	  faster	  processing	  of	  others’	  intentions	  than	  inferential	  accounts.	  However,	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  
easy	  to	  define	  how	  early	  a	  process	  has	  to	  occur	  for	  it	  to	  be	  considered	  non-­‐inferential.	  	  
Another	  interesting	  approach	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  attention	  in	  perceptual	  processing.	  Attention	  
binds	  together	  features	  (e.g.	  line	  orientation,	  colour)	  which	  are	  processed	  separately	  at	  earlier	  
stages	  of	  perception	  (Treisman	  &	  Gelade,	  1980).	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  processing	  of	  others’	  intentions	  
can	  occur	  without	  attention,	  this	  might	  be	  evidence	  that	  such	  processing	  is	  occurring	  pre-­‐attentively,	  
i.e.	  without	  additional	  inferential	  or	  cognitive	  demands.	  
The	  quality	  of	  perceptual	  stimulus	  required	  in	  order	  for	  intention	  inferences	  to	  be	  drawn	  is	  a	  source	  
of	  evidence	  whose	  support	  for	  either	  account	  is	  equivocal.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  section	  2.2	  that	  intention	  
information	  can	  be	  acquired	  from	  relatively	  impoverished	  stimuli,	  including	  point	  light	  displays	  of	  
actions,	  in	  which	  the	  only	  distinguishing	  feature	  between	  alternative	  stimuli	  is	  the	  action	  kinematics.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  appears	  to	  support	  a	  direct	  perception	  account:	  intention	  information	  can	  be	  
acquired	  without	  the	  rich	  contextual	  information	  which	  might	  support	  inferential	  reasoning.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  absence	  of	  contextual	  information	  might	  instead	  encourage	  the	  use	  of	  inferential	  
processes	  to	  ‘fill	  in’	  missing	  information.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	  therefore,	  whether	  the	  ability	  of	  observers	  to	  
acquire	  intentions	  from	  impoverished	  stimuli	  would	  be	  strong	  evidence	  for	  either	  account.	  
A	  final	  potential	  source	  of	  evidence	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  brain	  networks	  involved	  in	  intention	  
understanding.	  Put	  simplistically,	  if	  intention	  understanding	  recruits	  low-­‐level	  perceptual	  or	  motor	  
areas	  (including,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument,	  mirror	  neuron	  areas;	  but	  see	  section	  3.1)	  this	  would	  
better	  support	  a	  direct	  perception	  account,	  whereas	  recruitment	  of	  executive	  function	  areas	  such	  as	  
those	  involved	  in	  theory	  of	  mind	  or	  mentalizing	  might	  support	  an	  inferential	  account.	  Problems	  of	  
reverse	  inference	  aside,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  characterise	  the	  brain	  areas	  involved	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
intention	  information	  from	  others’	  actions?	  The	  difficulty	  here	  is	  that	  neural	  responses	  alone	  do	  not	  
demonstrate	  that	  an	  intention	  has	  been	  identified.	  For	  instance,	  differences	  in	  the	  neural	  responses	  
to	  two	  different	  actions	  may	  reflect	  perceptual	  processing	  of	  the	  two	  different	  kinematic	  profiles,	  
rather	  than	  identification	  of	  the	  actor’s	  differing	  intentions.	  Therefore	  brain	  imaging	  techniques	  
need	  to	  be	  used	  in	  combination	  with	  carefully	  designed	  behavioural	  tasks	  that	  measure	  intention	  
understanding,	  and	  which	  distinguish	  intention	  understanding	  from	  action	  perception.	  	  
The	  following	  behavioural	  definitions	  (see	  also	  Spunt,	  Falk,	  &	  Lieberman,	  2010;	  Spunt,	  Satpute,	  &	  
Lieberman,	  2011;	  Spunt	  &	  Lieberman,	  2012)	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  operationalise	  this	  distinction.	  Action	  
perception	  comprises	  processes	  that	  allow	  the	  observer	  to	  distinguish	  one	  action	  from	  another,	  to	  
identify	  what	  is	  being	  done,	  and	  how	  an	  action	  is	  being	  performed.	  Intention	  understanding	  
comprises	  processes	  that	  allow	  the	  observer	  to	  identify	  why	  an	  action	  is	  being	  performed,	  which	  
may	  involve	  identification	  of	  the	  actor’s	  immediate	  intention	  (to	  grasp	  a	  cup)	  or	  their	  higher-­‐level	  
intention	  based	  on	  contextual	  information	  (to	  drink	  versus	  to	  tidy	  up;	  Iacoboni	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  These	  
definitions	  highlight	  the	  need	  to	  design	  behavioural	  tasks	  that	  measure	  these	  different	  abilities,	  to	  
be	  used	  both	  in	  brain	  imaging	  studies	  and	  along	  with	  causal	  techniques	  such	  as	  brain	  stimulation,	  in	  
order	  to	  demonstrate	  whether	  particular	  brain	  areas	  are	  required	  for	  intention	  understanding,	  
rather	  than	  for	  perceptual	  processing	  of	  kinematic	  differences.	  	  
Overall,	  this	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  if	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  another’s	  intention	  from	  their	  actions	  
takes	  place	  quickly,	  without	  attention,	  and	  involves	  mostly	  low-­‐level	  perceptual	  or	  motor	  brain	  
networks,	  it	  would	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  direct	  perception	  account.	  If	  in	  contrast	  
identification	  of	  intention	  takes	  place	  more	  slowly,	  requires	  attention,	  and	  involves	  higher-­‐level	  
mentalizing	  networks,	  this	  would	  support	  an	  inferential	  account.	  
3.3.	  Timecourse	  of	  intention	  understanding	  
Two	  alternative	  approaches	  have	  been	  used	  to	  establish	  how	  quickly	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  
another’s	  intention	  occurs.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  measure	  response	  times	  to	  identify	  another’s	  intention;	  the	  
second	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  timepoint	  at	  which	  neural	  responses	  to	  observed	  actions	  differ	  
systematically	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  actor’s	  intentions.	  	  
A	  typical	  choice	  response	  time	  for	  a	  perceptual	  discrimination	  task	  is	  around	  250-­‐300	  ms	  (e.g.	  
Mochizuki,	  Franca,	  Huang,	  &	  Rothwell,	  2005;	  Neubert,	  Mars,	  Olivier,	  &	  Rushworth,	  2011).	  In	  
contrast,	  response	  times	  for	  intention	  identification	  tasks	  are	  considerably	  longer	  and	  also	  show	  a	  
wide	  degree	  of	  variability:	  Ortigue	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  demonstrated	  that	  response	  times	  to	  
identify	  the	  intention	  of	  an	  action	  (whether	  the	  actor	  intended	  to	  use	  an	  object	  or	  to	  move	  it)	  were	  
around	  600	  ms	  (however,	  these	  relatively	  fast	  responses	  were	  accompanied	  by	  relatively	  low	  
accuracy,	  and	  a	  similar	  task	  used	  by	  Avanzini	  and	  colleagues	  (2013)	  elicited	  response	  times	  of	  around	  
900	  ms);	  whereas	  response	  times	  in	  Sartori	  et	  al.	  (2011)’s	  study	  were	  around	  1200	  ms,	  and	  those	  of	  
Manera	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  around	  1500	  ms.	  In	  both	  of	  the	  latter	  studies,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  
distinguish	  between	  cooperative	  and	  competitive	  intentions;	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  is	  a	  more	  difficult	  
distinction	  than	  that	  between	  using	  and	  moving	  an	  object,	  or	  that	  the	  two	  actions	  are	  perceptually	  
more	  similar,	  making	  discrimination	  between	  the	  two	  more	  difficult.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
latter	  two	  studies	  used	  video	  stimuli	  and	  it	  was	  not	  specified	  from	  which	  timepoint	  the	  kinematics	  
for	  the	  two	  intentions	  started	  to	  differ,	  which	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  longer	  response	  times.	  
Although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  define	  exactly	  how	  fast	  a	  response	  should	  be	  to	  constitute	  evidence	  for	  
direct	  perception,	  the	  range	  of	  response	  times	  reported	  across	  these	  experiments	  suggests	  that	  
there	  is	  not	  a	  single,	  fast,	  path	  to	  intention	  identification.	  
The	  second	  approach	  to	  measuring	  the	  timecourse	  of	  intention	  identification	  does	  not	  require	  an	  
overt	  behavioural	  response,	  thus	  removing	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  response	  time	  which	  relate	  to	  
response	  key	  selection	  and	  purely	  motoric	  processes.	  For	  example,	  Ortigue	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  used	  
electroencephalography	  to	  measure	  the	  timecourse	  of	  the	  neural	  response	  while	  participants	  were	  
asked	  to	  identify	  an	  actor’s	  intentions.	  They	  found	  that	  novel,	  compared	  with	  repeated,	  intentions,	  
generated	  a	  different	  response	  at	  two	  timepoints,	  60-­‐130	  ms	  and	  330-­‐400	  ms	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  
action	  information	  which	  discriminated	  between	  intentions.	  However,	  differences	  in	  neural	  
response	  may	  reflect	  perceptual	  processing,	  rather	  than	  intention	  identification.	  	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  mirror	  response	  is	  considered	  by	  some	  authors	  to	  constitute	  intention	  
understanding	  it	  may	  be	  worth	  reviewing	  data	  on	  the	  timecourse	  of	  mirror	  responses.	  A	  recent	  
overview	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  response	  timecourse	  (Cavallo,	  Heyes,	  Becchio,	  Bird,	  &	  Catmur,	  2014)	  and	  
a	  more	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  human	  data	  (Naish,	  Houston-­‐Price,	  Bremner,	  &	  Holmes,	  2014)	  
both	  concluded	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  for	  mirror	  responses	  before	  200	  ms	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  an	  
observed	  action.	  Although	  a	  latency	  of	  200	  ms	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  relatively	  fast,	  this	  should	  be	  
compared	  with	  the	  latency	  of	  motor	  cortex	  responses	  during	  perceptual	  discrimination	  in	  response	  
selection	  tasks:	  premotor-­‐primary	  motor	  connections	  discriminate	  between	  different	  shaped	  cues	  as	  
early	  as	  75	  ms	  (O’Shea,	  Sebastian,	  Boorman,	  Johansen-­‐Berg,	  &	  Rushworth,	  2007).	  
Thus,	  neural	  responses	  may	  differentiate	  between	  actors’	  intentions	  as	  early	  as	  60	  ms	  after	  the	  
onset	  of	  discriminating	  information,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  such	  responses	  reflect	  anything	  more	  
than	  the	  perceptual	  differences	  between	  novel	  and	  repeated	  intentions.	  Matching	  motor	  (‘mirror’)	  
responses	  to	  others’	  actions	  are	  found	  after	  200	  ms,	  but	  whether	  such	  responses	  constitute	  
intention	  understanding	  is	  an	  outstanding	  empirical	  question	  (section	  3.1).	  Behavioural	  responses	  
when	  explicitly	  instructed	  to	  identify	  actors’	  intentions	  are	  of	  variable	  and	  relatively	  long	  latency.	  
These	  data	  do	  not	  provide	  consistent	  support	  for	  a	  fast,	  direct	  process	  for	  intention	  understanding.	  	  
3.4.	  The	  role	  of	  attention	  in	  intention	  understanding	  
Little	  previous	  work	  investigates	  whether	  intention	  understanding	  can	  occur	  pre-­‐attentively.	  Given	  
the	  lack	  of	  research	  into	  this	  question,	  and	  although	  section	  3.1	  casts	  doubt	  on	  whether	  activation	  of	  
one’s	  own	  motor	  program	  by	  the	  sight	  of	  another’s	  action	  constitutes	  intention	  understanding,	  it	  
may	  be	  useful	  to	  ask	  whether	  mirror	  responses	  occur	  under	  conditions	  of	  no,	  or	  limited,	  attention.	  
Recent	  data	  on	  imitative	  compatibility	  (the	  tendency	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  faster	  when	  observing	  the	  
same	  action	  than	  a	  different	  action;	  Heyes,	  2011;	  Stürmer,	  Aschersleben,	  &	  Prinz,	  2000),	  a	  
behavioural	  effect	  that	  is	  thought	  to	  index	  mirror	  neuron	  function	  (Catmur,	  Walsh,	  &	  Heyes,	  2009;	  
Heiser,	  Iacoboni,	  Maeda,	  Marcus,	  &	  Mazziotta,	  2003;	  Hogeveen	  et	  al.,	  in	  press),	  supports	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  mirror	  responses	  can	  occur	  with	  limited	  attention.	  Catmur	  (under	  review)	  used	  an	  
imitative	  compatibility	  design	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  mapping	  of	  an	  observed	  movement	  onto	  the	  
motor	  program	  for	  that	  movement	  occurs	  under	  conditions	  of	  limited	  attention	  (however	  see	  
Chong,	  Cunnington,	  Williams,	  &	  Mattingley,	  2009,	  for	  an	  alternative	  finding);	  and	  Dainton,	  Catmur,	  
and	  Marsh	  (in	  preparation)	  showed	  that	  attention	  affects	  spatial,	  but	  not	  imitative,	  compatibility.	  	  
Similar	  results	  come	  from	  neuroimaging	  data:	  both	  Chong	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  and	  Spunt	  and	  
Lieberman	  (2013)	  demonstrated	  that	  responses	  to	  observed	  actions	  in	  most	  mirror	  neuron	  areas	  
were	  not	  modulated	  by	  attentional	  demands.	  Interestingly,	  however,	  Spunt	  and	  Lieberman	  also	  
included	  a	  task	  which	  asked	  participants	  to	  infer	  the	  actor’s	  intentions.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  effects	  on	  
mirror	  neuron	  areas,	  the	  neural	  response	  in	  mentalizing	  regions	  during	  this	  intention	  understanding	  
task	  was	  modulated	  by	  attention.	  	  
Thus	  there	  is	  mixed	  evidence	  regarding	  whether	  mirror	  responses	  occur	  with	  limited	  attention.	  In	  
addition,	  unless	  we	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  mirror	  responses	  constitute	  intention	  understanding,	  this	  
does	  not	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  intention	  understanding	  occurs	  pre-­‐attentively.	  The	  fact	  
that	  manipulation	  of	  attention	  during	  an	  intention	  understanding	  task	  resulted	  in	  a	  reduction	  in	  
response	  in	  mentalizing	  regions	  (Spunt	  &	  Lieberman,	  2013)	  suggests	  that	  intention	  understanding	  
may	  not	  occur	  pre-­‐attentively;	  however,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  for	  future	  research	  to	  assess	  
behavioural	  measures	  of	  intention	  understanding	  under	  conditions	  of	  limited	  attention.	  
3.5.	  Brain	  networks	  involved	  in	  intention	  understanding	  
The	  results	  above	  lead	  to	  the	  question	  of	  which	  brain	  networks	  respond	  when	  participants	  are	  asked	  
to	  infer	  an	  actor’s	  intentions.	  Some	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  increased	  neural	  response	  in	  mirror	  
neuron	  areas	  when	  inferring	  intentions	  from	  actions	  (e.g.	  Vingerhoets	  et	  al.,	  2010);	  however,	  others	  
have	  found	  increased	  response	  in	  areas	  associated	  with	  mentalizing.	  For	  example,	  Brass	  and	  
colleagues	  (2007)	  measured	  neural	  responses	  while	  participants	  observed	  unusual	  actions	  in	  
plausible	  or	  implausible	  contexts.	  Increased	  response	  was	  found	  in	  mentalizing	  but	  not	  in	  mirror	  
neuron	  areas	  for	  implausible	  actions,	  suggesting	  that	  inferential,	  rather	  than	  mirroring,	  processes	  
underlie	  intention	  understanding	  for	  implausible	  actions.	  	  
Further	  studies	  have	  delineated	  the	  involvement	  of	  both	  mirror	  and	  mentalizing	  brain	  areas	  when	  
participants	  are	  asked	  to	  infer	  actors’	  intentions.	  The	  pattern	  of	  responses	  may	  depend	  to	  some	  
extent	  on	  the	  type	  of	  actions	  used:	  irrational,	  implausible	  or	  unusual	  actions	  generally	  produce	  
greater	  responses	  in	  mentalizing	  areas	  (Liepelt,	  Von	  Cramon,	  &	  Brass,	  2008;	  Marsh,	  Mullett,	  Ropar,	  
&	  Hamilton,	  2014),	  but	  de	  Lange	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  found	  that	  unusual	  actions	  produced	  greater	  
response	  in	  mirror	  areas.	  Note	  however	  that	  even	  in	  that	  study,	  when	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  
judge	  intentions,	  greater	  response	  was	  found	  in	  mentalizing	  areas;	  and	  even	  actions	  which	  are	  not	  
implausible	  tend	  to	  produce	  responses	  in	  mentalizing,	  as	  well	  as	  mirror,	  areas	  when	  participants	  are	  
asked	  to	  judge	  intentions	  (Becchio	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Ciaramidaro,	  Becchio,	  Colle,	  Bara,	  &	  Walter,	  2014).	  
Lieberman	  and	  colleagues	  suggest	  that	  mirror	  areas	  are	  involved	  in	  perceiving	  what	  is	  being	  done,	  
and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  action	  is	  performed	  (action	  perception;	  see	  section	  3.2),	  whereas	  
mentalizing	  areas	  are	  involved	  when	  inferring	  why	  an	  action	  is	  being	  performed	  (intention	  
understanding;	  Spunt	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  2011;	  Spunt	  &	  Lieberman,	  2012).	  This	  suggestion	  is	  consistent	  
with	  van	  Overwalle	  and	  Baetens	  (2009)’s	  review	  which	  concluded	  that	  the	  mirror	  system	  is	  not	  
involved	  in	  mentalizing	  in	  general,	  when	  biological	  motion	  is	  not	  present.	  Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  mirror	  
areas	  respond	  to	  actions	  (and	  may	  respond	  more	  when	  actions	  are	  unusual),	  but	  this	  response	  may	  
be	  solely	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  action	  stimuli:	  that	  is,	  it	  may	  be	  entirely	  unrelated	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
identifying	  the	  actor’s	  intentions.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  lower-­‐level	  mirror	  versus	  higher-­‐level	  mentalizing	  networks	  are	  
involved	  in	  intention	  understanding	  appears	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  stimuli	  used,	  and	  the	  task	  
instructions	  (i.e.	  whether	  participants	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  identify	  intentions).	  However,	  brain	  
imaging	  measures	  cannot	  demonstrate	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  brain	  areas	  in	  a	  particular	  process;	  thus	  
sections	  3.6	  and	  3.7	  review	  the	  causal	  evidence	  for	  the	  involvement	  of	  mirror	  and	  mentalizing	  areas	  
in	  intention	  understanding.	  
3.6.	  The	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  action	  perception	  and	  intention	  understanding	  
Various	  studies	  have	  investigated	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  in	  action	  perception.	  Data	  from	  
both	  neuropsychological	  lesion	  studies	  (see	  Urgesi,	  Candidi,	  &	  Avenanti,	  2014,	  for	  a	  recent	  meta-­‐
analysis)	  and	  ‘virtual	  lesion’	  brain	  stimulation	  studies	  (summarised	  in	  Catmur,	  2014)	  indicate	  that	  
mirror	  neuron	  brain	  areas	  –	  in	  particular,	  premotor	  cortex	  –	  are	  required	  for	  tasks	  involving	  the	  
perception	  of	  others’	  actions.	  However,	  few	  if	  any	  of	  these	  studies	  use	  tasks	  involving	  intention	  
understanding.	  	  
The	  study	  which	  comes	  closest	  to	  doing	  so	  asked	  participants	  to	  judge	  whether	  an	  actor	  was	  trying	  
to	  deceive	  them	  by	  lifting	  a	  heavy	  box	  as	  though	  it	  were	  light,	  and	  vice-­‐versa	  (Tidoni,	  Borgomaneri,	  
di	  Pellegrino,	  &	  Avenanti,	  2013).	  The	  authors	  found	  that	  disruptive	  premotor	  stimulation	  impaired	  
participants’	  ability	  to	  judge	  deception	  from	  observed	  actions;	  however,	  they	  suggest	  that	  this	  effect	  
relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  good	  performance	  in	  this	  task	  relies	  strongly	  on	  processing	  of	  kinematic	  
differences	  between	  valid	  and	  deceptive	  actions.	  Thus	  premotor	  cortex	  may	  contribute	  to	  intention	  
understanding	  via	  its	  role	  in	  action	  perception;	  but	  these	  data	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  a	  clear	  role	  for	  
mirror	  neuron	  areas	  in	  intention	  understanding	  according	  to	  the	  distinction	  set	  out	  in	  section	  3.2.	  	  
An	  elegantly	  designed	  study	  by	  Michael	  and	  colleagues	  (2014)	  was	  the	  first	  to	  address	  this	  issue.	  
Participants	  performed	  three	  tasks	  during	  disruptive	  stimulation	  of	  premotor	  cortex.	  One	  task	  tested	  
only	  action	  perception;	  the	  second	  tested	  both	  action	  perception	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  the	  
actor’s	  immediate	  intention;	  and	  the	  third	  tested	  action	  perception,	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  the	  actor’s	  
immediate	  intention,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  the	  actor’s	  higher-­‐level	  intention.	  If	  mirror	  neuron	  
areas	  are	  involved	  in	  action	  perception,	  then	  disruption	  of	  premotor	  cortex	  should	  impair	  
performance	  on	  all	  three	  tasks.	  If	  they	  are	  additionally	  involved	  in	  intention	  understanding,	  then	  
disruption	  of	  premotor	  cortex	  should	  have	  increased	  the	  impairment	  for	  the	  second	  and	  third	  tasks.	  
Crucially,	  disruptive	  stimulation	  of	  premotor	  cortex	  impaired	  participants’	  performance	  on	  all	  three	  
tasks,	  with	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  tasks.	  As	  the	  psychological	  process	  common	  to	  each	  
task	  is	  that	  of	  action	  perception,	  these	  data	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  mirror	  neuron	  areas	  are	  involved	  
in	  action	  perception	  (which	  of	  course	  may	  be	  an	  initial	  stage	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  others’	  
intentions),	  but	  these	  data	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  evidence	  for	  the	  involvement	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  areas	  
in	  higher-­‐level	  processes	  of	  intention	  understanding	  beyond	  this	  initial	  stage.	  	  
3.7.	  The	  role	  of	  mentalizing	  areas	  in	  intention	  understanding	  
Surprisingly	  few	  studies	  have	  investigated	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  mentalizing	  areas	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  infer	  
intentions	  from	  actions.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  two	  factors:	  research	  into	  mentalizing	  has	  focused	  on	  
other	  aspects	  of	  mentalizing	  such	  as	  theory	  of	  mind;	  and	  a	  key	  node	  of	  the	  mentalizing	  network,	  the	  
medial	  prefrontal	  cortex,	  is	  not	  easily	  accessible	  to	  brain	  stimulation	  techniques.	  The	  one	  study	  that	  
has	  investigated	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  mentalizing	  network	  in	  understanding	  intentions	  from	  
others’	  actions	  targeted	  the	  posterior	  superior	  temporal	  sulcus	  (Stolk	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  These	  authors	  
showed	  that	  disruptive	  stimulation	  of	  this	  area	  impaired	  the	  ability	  to	  infer	  intentions	  from	  actions	  
in	  a	  communicative	  task.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  further	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  performed	  to	  
establish	  whether	  mentalizing	  areas	  are	  required	  to	  infer	  intentions	  from	  observed	  actions.	  
4.	  Summary	  and	  conclusions	  
Actions	  performed	  with	  different	  intentions	  produce	  different	  kinematic	  profiles,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  
in	  principle	  possible	  to	  use	  perceptual	  information	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  decoding	  another’s	  
intentions;	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  observers	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  this,	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  they	  do	  so	  using	  direct	  perceptual	  or	  inferential	  processes.	  I	  proposed	  that	  four	  conditions	  
should	  be	  fulfilled	  in	  order	  to	  conclude	  that	  others’	  intentions	  can	  be	  understood	  using	  direct	  
perception;	  the	  extant	  data	  only	  support	  two	  of	  these	  conditions.	  Furthermore,	  a	  working	  definition	  
of	  the	  distinction	  between	  action	  perception	  and	  intention	  understanding	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  further	  empirical	  progress.	  	  
I	  reviewed	  three	  sources	  of	  evidence	  which	  could	  contribute	  data	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  direct	  
or	  inferential	  processes	  underlie	  intention	  understanding.	  Timecourse	  data	  do	  not	  support	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  fast,	  direct	  route	  for	  intention	  understanding.	  Some	  data	  suggest	  that	  action	  
perception	  may	  occur	  pre-­‐attentively,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  intention	  understanding	  does.	  
Brain	  imaging	  data	  suggest	  that	  both	  mirror	  neuron	  and	  mentalizing	  networks	  are	  involved	  in	  
intention	  understanding,	  but	  there	  is	  limited	  causal	  evidence	  for	  the	  role	  of	  either	  mirror	  or	  
mentalizing	  areas	  in	  intention	  understanding.	  From	  the	  existing	  evidence,	  it	  appears	  that	  mirror	  
neuron	  areas	  are	  involved	  in	  action	  perception,	  a	  process	  which	  may	  be	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  
for	  intention	  understanding.	  	  
Although	  the	  evidence	  is	  still	  incomplete,	  it	  does	  not	  support	  a	  direct	  perception	  account,	  and	  in	  
particular	  does	  not	  support	  the	  intention	  understanding	  theory	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  function.	  Given	  the	  
current	  data,	  the	  most	  likely	  scenario	  is	  that	  mirror	  areas	  provide	  sensorimotor	  information	  to	  
mentalizing	  areas	  in	  order	  to	  support	  and	  constrain	  inferential	  processes	  of	  intention	  understanding;	  
future	  research	  should	  focus	  on	  testing	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  mentalizing	  areas	  in	  acquiring	  intentions	  
from	  others’	  actions	  in	  order	  to	  support	  or	  refute	  this	  model.	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